societies? This study uses survey data to explore the residual impact of revolution on individuals' electoral participation, civil society engagement, and social capital. It takes as its case study Nicaragua shortly after the revolution ended in 1990, and examines Nicaraguans in comparison to their Central American neighbors.

ited and undermined the status of the revolution's supporters, and may thus have diminished the revolution's residual imprint on political behavior and social capital (Lundgren 2000, 113–217). The survey for this study was conducted 15 months after the Sandinistas relinquished power, and it is possible that even by that early date the revolution's impact on attitudes and behaviors might have abated as institutions changed.

The effects of the Nicaraguan revolution may also have been limited because the FSLN never truly monopolized national political and economic life as other successful revolutionary movements have done. Throughout the revolution, opposition parties and civil society existed legally and actually participated in governance. From 1979 to 1984, non-Sandinista parties

cratic norms, impede group participation, and depress or alter other forms of political involvement (Muller and Seligson 1994; Tarrow 1996; Booth and Richard 1996, 1998a, b; Rose et al. 1998; Shin 1999).

In the 1980s, Central America provided an array of contrasting regimes and regime experiences, but by the early 1990s, all six countries had adopted formal electoral democracy. Nicaragua's Sandinista revolution and the protracted Contra war had just ended. El Salvador and Guatemala were still locked in civil wars, but negotiations were under way to end them, and electoral institutions had begun to function. Honduras had emerged from authoritarian rule by gradual military devolution of power to civilians. U.S. military intervention had established a semblance of formal democracy in Panama. Costa Rica stood out in the region for the age and stability of its democracy, but was no longer the Isthmus's only civilian electoral regime, as it had been for most of several previous decades. Such variation in the political context in these six nations during the 1980s should have resulted in differentiated patterns of civil society and social capital. These, in turn, should have had differential effects on citizens' voting and campaign behavior. Nicaragua's patterns of social capital should have sharply diverged from those of its neighbors, given its unique experience with revolution and its record of extensive political mobilization.

In concrete terms, the hypothesis of distinctiveness leads us to expect that the revolution would have elevated Nicaraguans' electoral engagement, because registering to vote, voting, and campaigning became the means of political competition, and because competition over whether to continue or end the revolution was so intense in 1990. We expect that the revolution's efforts to mobilize citizens through particular groups and the extensive countermobilization by opposition forces would have elevated civil society involvement in school- and church-related groups, as well as communal organizations and unions. After 11 years of leftist government, more Nicaraguans than other Central Americans would identify themselves as leftists; and because the revolution's domestic opposition was still savoring the FSLN's historic electoral defeat when the survey was conducted, left-right polarization could be expected to be particularly intense. Finally, because much of the popular mobilization promoted by both regime and opposition during the revolution involved protest and confrontation, Nicaraguans could be expected to be exceptionally tolerant of confrontational political tactics.

The alternative hypothesis of similarity suggests that all six isthmian countries would have common patterns of electoral behavior, and that social capital differences between Nicaragua and its neighbors would be few. This argument is based on the persistence of opposition throughout the Nicaraguan revolution, the quick resurgence of traditional prerevolutionary political practices, post-1990 efforts to roll back revolu-

tionary institutional changes, and the regional convergence on electoral democracy shaped substantially by external pressures.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Data from comparable surveys, conducted cross-nationally in the early to middle 1990s among the urban citizens of six Central American nations, that explored a broad array of attributes, including electoral participation, social capital attitudes, and civil society activism, were analyzed.[2] Many of these items have been widely validated and field-tested in various cultural settings (Booth and Seligson 1984; Muller et al. 1987; Seligson and Gómez B. 1989; Seligson and Booth 1993).

Social capital is defined as a product of social relations (e.g., reciprocal expectations, authority relations, and social organizations) and individual traits, such as obligations, expectations, information, and norms that help "individuals and collective actors get things done better" (Coleman 1988, S95; see also Foley and Edwards 1996; Newton 1997). Civil society refers to formal social organization outside of government, which here is operationalized as the frequency of respondent involvement in voluntary associations. Civil society and social capital theories, buttressed by prior research, posit that civil society shapes the formation of important social capital. Social capital and civil society, in turn, jointly influence political engagement. For instance, group membership and certain politically relevant attitudes may motivate electoral and other political participation and thus indirectly impinge on the state (Richard and Booth 2000).

The principal hypothesis predicts that Nicaragua's revolution will have left discernible and distinctive imprints on social capital, especially civil society and election-related behavior. Indeed, Sergio Ramírez Mercado's previously cited opinion about the revolution's goal for individual citizens—to establish a "permanent dynamic of the people's participation . . . [to] give their opinions. . . , suggest, construct, and direct, . . . organize themselves"—is a statement about shaping civil society, social capital, and political involvement. Because the Sandinistas mobilized citizens to support the revolution and its policies, and because others countermobilized against the revolution, one would expect Nicaraguans to have relatively high levels of civil society activism compared to other Central Americans, especially in groups related to communities, schools, and unions. The FSLN, for instance, especially mobilized Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) at the community and neighborhood level, along with labor unions, and parent groups associated with a greatly expanded public school system. The revolutionary government also promoted elections, allowed multiple political parties, and encouraged citizens to vote and campaign. In most of Central Amer-

Table 1. Electoral Participation by Urban Dwellers in Central American Countries, early 1990s

Variable (%)	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Panama	Region
Registered to vote	80.2	96.1	80.2	80.4	95.6	96.1	87.3
Voted in last election	80.1	91.1	55.8	70.9	89.0	75.8	76.9
Ever tried to persuade another person how to vote	19.8	34.5	7.9	13.9	45.6	45.9	28.1
Ever worked for a candidate or party	20.7	42.0	7.0	9.4	45.6	29.4	25.8
Indexes (mean scores)							
Voting behavior index	1.62	1.91	1.39	1.51	1.86	1.72	1.67
(Rank within region on voting)	(4)	(1)	(6)	(5)	(2)	(3)	
Campaigning index	.47	.87	.18	.25	1.08	.84	.62
(Rank within region on campaigning)	(4)	(2)	(6)	(5)	(1)	(3)	

Table 2. Social Capital and Civil Society Variables, Urban Dwellers in Central American Countries, early 1990s

	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Panama	Region
Attitudes/Values Indexes							
Diffuse support	4.51 (2)	5.06	3.97	4.14	3.53	3.80	4.16

measure treats repression as a systemic constraint on individuals at the polity level and includes two equally weighted components, one measuring repression at the time of the survey, the other the history of repression in the decade before the survey. The average of the two provides a repression score for each country, which is assigned to each respondent by nation of r

of leftist and rightist identification. Nicaragua's level of identification with the political left, the highest in the region, may be the clearest indication of the revolution's legacy. Likewise, the near-parity of left and right identification indicates ideological polarization, almost certainly an effect of revolution and resistance to it. (The degree of identification with left and right permits a cross-national comparison of ideological polarization in these countries; the uniqueness of each national party system prevents particular parties, and therefore party identification per se, from being meaningfully compared across borders.) Elsewhere in the region, identification with the ideological right predominates. The country with the next-closest ratio of leftist to rightist identification is El Salvador, which also experienced a broad-based, left-driven popular mobilization during the insurgency. In El Salvador at the time of the survey, the insurgent and other leftists were negotiating a settlement of the civil war that would allow them to survive with a strong political party base. Thus in several attitudes and values, Nicaragua reveals patterns consistent with both an imprint of revolution and the distinctiveness hypothesis.

With respect to civil society measures, the data show other indications of the revolution's impact. Nicaragua has the highest level of school group involvement. This probably results from the revolution's massive public education effort and the continuing political conflict over education during the Chamorro administration in the early 1990s. Urban Nicaraguans reported the second-highest level of union activism, behind Hondurans, and roughly the same level as Guatemalans and Panamanians. In the survey year, 1991, Nicaraguans had the lowest mean involvement in professional associations. This was probably due to the emigration of many professionals during the revolution, the Contra war, the country's economic meltdown of the 1980s, and to the intense politicization of professional groups during the revolution. Nicaragua's rank (tied for fourth) on cooperative and sk s i o

Table 3. Civil Society–Social Capital Model of Voting Among
Urban Dwellers (by country)

Variables	Nicaragua	Guatemala, El Salvador	Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama	Region Without Nicaragua
Social Capital:				
Attitudes/Values				
Diffuse support		.038	.014	
Support civil disobedience				
Suppress civil rights			.008	
Left identification	.046			
Right identification				.019
Democratic norms		.022		.017
Civil Society Activism				
Church group				−.044
School group		.143		.065
Communal group				
Professional association			.067	.092
Union	.164			
Cooperative				
Civic group				−.074
Context				
Perceived violence			.015	−.057
Demographic				
Education		.579	.117	.213
Living standard				.140
Sex (M=1, F=2)		.092		−.047
Age	.007	.154	.004	.008
R^2	.058	.131	.036	.118
Standard error of the estimate	.671	.736	.404	.563
Significance	.042	.000	.000	.000
Number of cases	508	988	1,802	2,792

Beta-coefficients presented significant at .10 or less.

Table 4. Civil Society–Social Capital Model of Campaigning Among
Urban Dwellers (by country)

Variables	Nicaragua	Guatemala, El Salvador	Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama	Region Without Nicaragua
Social Capital:				
Attitudes/Values				
Diffuse support		.022		−.031
Support civil disobedience	.057		.045	.046
Suppress civil rights			.017	
Left identification	.098	.077		
Right identification	.045	.060		.063
Democratic norms	.041	.031		.031
Civil Society Activism				
Church group				−.075
School group				
Communal group	.279	.111	.175	.150
Professional association				
Union	.254		.198	.176
Cooperative			−.119	
Civic group		.141	.322	.220
Context				
Perceived violence		−.048	−.064	−.151
Demographic				
Education			.509	.323
Living standard	.504	.214	−.420	
Sex (M=1, F=2)	−.216		−.192	−.146
Age		.004	−.003	
R^2	.197	.097	.086	.151
Standard error of the estimate	.730	.563	1.000	.900
Significance	.000	.000	.000	.000
Number of cases	504	1,035	1,885	2,922

Beta-coefficients presented significant at .10 or less.

diverges from the higher-violence nations, one may reasonably credit its revolutionary experience.

National laws and state support for voting in the 1980s encouraged voting throughout Central America. Facing a major choice over the revolution's survival in the 1990 election, however, Nicaraguans' participation in voting exceeded that of the other higher-violence countries, as well as Panama (see table 1). Campaigning requires more time than voting and, especially in a polarized environment such as Nicaragua and El Salvador, involves displaying one's political affiliation in ways that expose one to controversy and to the possibly intense disapproval of other citizens. This form of political participation tends to be higher in lower-violence countries and lower in higher-violence ones (table 1).

The models of the effects of civil society and social capital on voting in table 3 r

CONCLUSIONS

Nicaragua's history of revolution and revolutionary government left certain identifiable imprints on social capital and electoral behavior, as the distinctiveness hypothesis suggests. In the early 1990s, Nicaragua stood out from the rest of the isthmian countries in its degree of leftist identification and the consequent rough balance in leftist and rightist identification. Certain values and behaviors embedded in the revolutionary experience, moreover, led Nicaraguans to take part in campaigning: leftist and rightist identification, support for civil disobedience and confrontational political methods, commitment to democratic norms, and involvement in communal associations and unions.

The findings of this study additionally demonstrate the impact of political context on electoral engagement. The influence of context may be seen in the contribution of leftist and rightist identification to campaign involvement in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, all countries that experienced intense and protracted insurrections and counterinsurgency during the 1970s and 1980s. A history of violence and repression raises the stakes of campaign activism, leading many citizens to cede the terrain to those who have the ideological commitment that helps them assume the risks of participating. Prior research has reported that systemic violence depresses both voting and campaigning in Central America, highlighting how the institutional-historical context of national politics shapes citizen participation (Booth and Richard 1996, 1998b). Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which experienced higher levels of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence, reveal lower voting and campaigning levels than the countries that had less such violence and repression.

Did Nicaragua's revolution influence attitudes and behaviors in ways that persist beyond the revolution? In some areas the answer is straightforward. For example, did the revolution lead Nicaraguans toward authoritarianism? No. Instead, Nicaraguans emerged from the revolutionary years as supporters of democracy. Indeed, Nicaragua in 1991 evidenced more support for democratic values than El Salvador and Guatemala, neighboring countries with turbulent and violent politics but without a successful revolution. The Nicaraguan revolution's main institutional legacy is a more democratic electoral system and lessened institutional authoritarianism. Such outcomes have been rare among postrevolutionary regimes.

What traits of Nicaraguan social capital were distinctive in the early 1990s? A greater proportion of Nicaraguans than other Central Americans identified with the political left, producing a unique pattern for the region of relatively balanced levels of leftist and rightist identification. Only in Nicaragua did identification with the political left add to voting

participation. Identification with both left and right, along with support for democratic norms, contributed to campaign involvement in Nicaragua, as they also did in El Salvador and Guatemala. In terms of civil society, Nicaragua was not clearly divergent in factors contributing to campaign involvement, though union participation was associated with higher levels of voting activities in Nicaragua but not elsewhere. Involvement in civic groups led to greater campaign activity in the rest of the region but not in Nicaragua.

International pressures for electoral democracy, and the revolution's own strategy to build its legitimacy by adopting an electoral regime and winning power by electoral rules, led Nicaragua toward the adoption of formal electoral democracy. External and internal pressures on the other turbulent Central American states moved them toward adopting similar electoral institutions. On the other hand, Nicaragua's levels of participation in voting, attempting to persuade others how to vote, and working on a campaign were considerably higher than those in El Salvador and Guatemala. This reveals that the revolution in Nicaragua made democracy-building contributions greater than those stemming mostly from external pressures.

Nicaraguans were less mobilized than expected, especially in communal, church-related, and civic groups. It is possible that, by the time of the six national surveys employed for this analysis, many Nicaraguans once involved in Sandinista mass organizations had demobilized out of frustration with the party and its treatment of their groups. At the same time, many anti-Sandinista group members may also have demobilized with the loss of their _____ at the revolution's demise in 1990. Groups and their individual members on both sides of the struggle may have also suffered exhaustion from the intensity of the political struggles of the 1980s. Resource flows intended to support mobilization and countermobilization undoubtedly dropped off. In contrast, union and school group engagement probably persisted at higher levels because of their continued importance to their members after the revolution's demise.

The lower-than-expected civil society activism suggests that a first area in which revolution's impact may erode is citizens' voluntary involvement in organizations. Once the struggle over the regime ends, as it did in Nicaragua in 1990, many citizens may disengage from the groups through which they once pressed for their interests. They may do so whether defeated or victorious, disillusioned or validated, and, in any case, probably exhausted from the protracted political conflict and tension of organizational life in

fication levels, in left-right polarization, and in how civil society and social capital affected voting behavior. On the other hand, postrevolutionary Nicaragua fails to stand out from its neighbors in levels of electoral engagement, other civil society activism, or social capital's effect on campaigning.

Taking a long step back from the details of the findings and returning to the original questions about revolution's effects, it appears that the balance of the argument tilts in favor of the similarity hypothesis as it regards electoral participation. The Nicaraguan case supports the argument that revolution's effects are likely to decay rapidly. Even so soon after the revolution ended, Nicaraguans' electoral engagement remarkably resembled that of their nonrevolutionary neighbors. This probably stems from a convergence of forces from within (the revolution) and without (great power foreign policy and other countries' electoral reforms), which pushed Nicaraguans and other Central Americans to adopt similar electoral institutions that constrained their behavior in similar ways. Yet the revolution made a difference in social capital. Nicaragua's distinctiveness in political-ideological alignments and civil society mobilization around schools and unions suggests that in certain areas the revolution mattered a great deal.

It is possible that a broader search for other possible areas of revolution's influence—other behaviors and forms of social capital and their differing rates of change—could tell us more. As comparable data from more recent surveys of the region become available, researchers may be able to answer these questions more conclusively.

APPENDIX: INDEX CONSTRUCTION

The following indexes are presented in the order of their appearance in the tables.

Electoral Involvement Indexes

combines scores of 1.0 for reporting having voted in the last election (zero if not), and 1.0 for reporting being registered to vote (range 0–2.0).

sterring raf03 Tertain

tutions (courts, legislature, system as a whole, etc.). Range: low diffuse support = 0, high = 7.

_____ is an average level of respondent agreement with seven items measuring support for general political participation rights (vote, etc.) and participatory rights for regime critics (tolerance). Range: low democratic norms = 0, high = 10.

_____ and protest behavior reports respondent's mean level of agreement on an 11-point scale with legally demonstrating, blocking streets, occupying public buildings, attempting to overthrow regime. Range: 0 = low, 10 = high.

_____ is an index of respondents' mean level of agreement with suppressing civil liberties (i.e., support for censorship, banning legal demonstrations, etc.). Range: 0 = low, 10 = high.

_____ measures intensity of self-identification with leftist positions on a left-right continuum: 0 = right to neutral, 1 = slightly left, 5 = farthest left.

_____ measures intensity of self-identification with rightist positions on a left-right continuum: 0 = left to neutral, 1 = slightly right, 5 = farthest right.

Civil Society Activism Indexes

_____ each indicate the respondent's reported frequency of attendance at meetings of this type: never = 0, 1 = "from time to time," 2 = "frequently."

Context Measures

- _____ at the system level: half of score is based on the level of repression at time of survey, and half is based on repression during decade before survey; the score is the mean of the two. Very low repression = 1, very high repression = 5. All respondents for each country receive the country score.
- _____ is a single item: "How much political violence is in the country?" "None" 0.014 to 0 0 10 is in

NOTES

Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1984. The Political Culture of Author-
    itarianism in Mexico: A Reexamination. _____ 19,
    1: 106 24.
Booth, John A., and Patricia Bayer Richard. 1996. Repression, Participation, and
    Democratic Norms in Urban Central America. _____
    _____ 40: 1205 32.
–––. 1998a. Civil Society, Political Capital, and Democratization in Central
    America. _____ 60: 780 800.
–––. 1998b. Civil Society and Political Context in Central America. _____
    _____ 42: 33 46.
Booth, John A., Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker. 2006. _____
    _____. 4th ed. Boul-
    der: Westview Press.
Calvert, Peter. 1970. _____. New York: Praeger.
Castro, Vanessa, and Gary Prevost, eds. 1992. _ _ 1 O E _____
    _____. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Coleman. James S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. ____
    _____ 94: S95 S120.
Deonandan, Kalowatie. 2004. The Caudillo Is Dead: Long Live the Caudillo. In
    _____ E_____, ed. David Close
    and Deonandan. Lanham: Lexington Books. 183–98.
Diamond, Larry. 1999. _____. Balti-
    more: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Eastis, Carla M. 1998. Organizational Diversity and the Production of Social Cap-
    ital: One of These Groups is Not Like the Other. _____
    _____ 42: 66 77.
Eckstein, Susan. 1993. The Impact of Revolution on Social Welfare in Latin
    America. In Goldstone 1993. 120–35.
Edwards, Bob, and Michael W. Foley. 1997. Social Capital and the Political Econ-
    omy of Our Discontent. _____ ds, Bob, and Michael W.ork: 199mn

Gibson, James L. 2001. Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition. 45: 51–68.

Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. Berkeley: University of California Pr

Payne, J. Mark, Daniel Zovatto G., Fernando Carrillo Flórez, and Andrés Allamand Zavala. 2002. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank/International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Prevost, Gary. 1992. The FSLN in Opposition. In Castro and Prevost 1992.

––––. 1997. The Status of the Sandinista Revolutionary Project. In Prevost and Vanden 1997. 148–79.

Prevost, Gary, and Harry E. Vanden, eds. 1997. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Richard, Patricia Bayer, and John A. Booth. 2000. Civil Society and Democratic Transition in Central America. In Walker and Armony 2000.

Robinson, William I. 1996. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

––––. 2003. London: Verso.

Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rosenband, Leonard N. 2001. Social Capital in the Early Industrial Revolution. In ed. Robert I. Rotberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 97–120.

Ruchwarger, Gary. 1987. South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey.

Ryan, Phil. 1995. Montreal: McGill/Queens University Press.

Sederberg, Peter C. 1994. New York: HarperCollins.

Selbin, Eric. 1997. Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In. In ed. John Foran. New York: Routledge. 123–26.

Seligson, Mitchell A., and John A. Booth. 1993. Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. 55: 777–92.

Seligson, Mitchell A., and Miguel Gómez B. 1989. Ordinary Elections in Extraordinary Times. In ed. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 158–84.

Sewell, William H., Jr. 1994. Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case. In ed. Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 169–98.

Shin, Doh C. 1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1994. Explaining Social Revolutions: First and Further Thoughts. In ed. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 99–119.

Spalding, Rose J. 1994. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Stacey, Judith. 1993. Families, Women, and Minorities in Revolutions: Peasant Families and the People's War in the Chinese Revolution. In Goldstone 1993. 94–106.

Stolle, Dietlind, and Thomas R. Rochon. 1998. Are All Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type, and the Creation of Social Capital. 42: 47 65.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's 90: 389 97.

Vanden, Harry E. 1997. Democracy Derailed: The 1990 Elections and After. In Prevost and Vanden 1997. 45–73.

Walker, Thomas W. 1981. Boulder: Westview Press.

Walker, Thomas W., ed. 1997. 1 0. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources.

Walker, Thomas W., and Ariel C. Armony, eds. 2000. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources.

Wright, Bruce E. 1995. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Wuthnow, Robert. 1999. Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of Religious Involvement. In E , ed. Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 331–63.