politicians and brokers, and how types of brokers vary across contexts. The article con-
CGPA$I0_H450"0AHICPIIH&L0&'0F&IIHRG$0"M$LP$I0'&@0'P4P@$0@I"@C5B

8 9+&)7')!"#$%&$"#' (:

9GH$L4$GHIDOHI0"04NF$0&'0GHL^"#$0I4@"4$#N045"40F"@4H$I0A$FG&N04&0_HL0$G$C4H&LI0>`H4IC5$G4=
(OOOJB% a$0A$'HL$0H40"I045$

B(The characterization of the clientelistic exchange as personalized or individualized (and often face-to-face) helps distinguish clientelism from other forms of dis-
4@HRP4HM$0F&GH4HCI0HL0_5HC5045$0$?C5"L#$0HLM&GM$I0#@&PFI0&'0M&4$@IB0+L0F&@^\R"@@$G0F&GH4HCI=0
'&@0$?"DFG$=0M@N&L$0_5&0GHM$I0HL0"0C$@4"HL0"@$"0@CHM$I0"0R$L$'H4B0!&GH4HCH"LI04"@#$40

!*+,-./01*2 3045$02612*/0*.7.8*9:0.,9;9<2!./+8=0!2<+-+9 70>&?'&@A@$BC&DEF&GH4HCIJB0>CJ02?'&@A0KLHM$@IH4N0!@$II0
K78=0(O%)B08GG0*H#5410*I@M$AB0!$@I&L"G0PI$0&LGNQ0C&DD$@CH"G0PI$0HI0I4@HC4GN0F@&5HRH4$AB0!G$"I$0I$$0"FFGHC"RG$0!@HM"CN0!&GHCN0
"LA0<$#"G0,&4HC$0>'&@0A$4"HGI0I$$!@HM"CN0!&GHCN "LA<$#"G0,&4HC$JB

8G45&P#50"GG0&'045$0"R&M$0$?"DFG$I0"@$0F@HM"4$0#&&AI=0H40HI0&'0C&P@I$0F&IIHRG$04&0AHI4@HRP4$0F@HM"4$0#&&AI045@&P#50F@&#@"DD"4HC0F&GH4HCI0@"45$@045"L045@&P#50CGH$L4$GHIDB[d] In programmatic politics, a set of rules stipulates the conditions under which citizens should re-CHM0C$@4"HL0R$L$'H4I=0"LA0"GG0CH4HY$LI0_5&0I"4HI'N045&I$0@$ZPH@DL4I0@CHM$045$0RL'H4=0 without any bias or discretion. The group is defined in abstract terms—for instance, the poor, the unemployed—and all people thus defined receive the benefit. No member of the group can be excluded. More importantly, in programmatic politics there is no explicit expectation that recipients will reciprocate with political support. By contrast, patrons ex-F$C40CGH$L4I04&0$L#"#$0HL0"0LPDR$@0&'0"C4HMH4H$I=0HLCGPAHL#04P@LHL#0&P40&L0.G$C4H&L0/"N=0 voting for a specific candidate, attending rallies, or helping out with the campaign. Moreover, the clientelistic exchange is discretionary because patrons (or brokers) enjoy consid-$@"RG$0G$$_"N0HL0A$CHAHL#0_5&0@$CHMI045$0R$L$'H40&@0C"L0D"^$0CGH$L4I0R$GHM045$N05"M$0 such leeway. There are no formal rules governing the distribution of goods or favors. Brokers and politicians target benefits based on the perceived responsiveness of certain vot-$@I=045$0L$$A04&0I_"N0I&D$0M&4$@I0HL0&@A$@04&0_HL=04&0D"HL4"HL045$0GC4&@"G0R"I$=0&@0'&@0F$@I&L"G0"LA0C"@$$@0#&"GIB

3&I40A$'HLH4H&LI0&'0CGH$L4$GHID0$DF5"IHY$045$0ZPHA0F@&0ZP&0L"4P@$0&'045$0$?C5"L#$0HL0"0M$@N0IF$CH'HC0_"NS045$0F@&MHIH&L0&'045$0#&&AI0"LA0I$@MHC$I0HI0C&L4HL#$L40PF&L045$0"C4H&LI0&'045$0CGH$L4B01&@0HLI4"LC$=0'&@074&^$I0$40"GB0>(O%V, p. 13), "the party offers material bene-'H4I0&LGN0&L045$0C&LAH4H&L045"4045$0@$CHFH$L40@$4P@LI045$0'"M&@0_H450"0M&4$0&@0&45$@0'&@D0&'0 political support." Similarly, Kitschelt and Wilkinson ((OOW) consider a clientelistic exchange to be made up of three components: "contingent direct exchange, predictability, and monitoring" (p. 9).[X] 1@&D045HI0F$@IF$C4HM$=04_&0D&@$0C&LAH4H&LI0"@$0L$C$II"@N0R$'&@$0"L0$?C5"L#$0C"L0R$0CG"IIH'H$A0"I0CGH$L4$GHI4HCB01H@I4=045$0F"4@&L0DPI40^L&_=0HL'$@=0&@0>"4045$0 very least) be able to make the client believe that it is possible to monitor political behav-H&@B0-5HI0D"N0HLM&GM$0I&D$0D$C5"LHID045"40MH&G"4$I045$0I$C@$CN0&'045$0R"GG&40&@045"40D"^$I045$0CGH$L40R$GHM045"4045HI0HI0"0@$"G0F&IIHRHGH4NB0+L045$I$0C"I$I=0F"@4N0D"C5HL$I0_H450 an army of politicians and brokers "deeply embedded in social networks" are required to IGC40"FF@&F@H"4$0CGH$L4I0"LA0D&LH4&@045$H@0R$5"MH&@0>74&^$I=(OO)=0FB0%fJB07$C&LA=045$0 client should believe that she could be punished if she reneges on her side of the agree-D$L4B0+L0&45$@0_&@AI=0'&@0"0CGH$L4$GHI4HC0$?C5"L#$04&04"^$0FG"C$=045$0F"4@&L0I5&PGA0R$0"RG$04&0HA$L4H'N0L&LC&DFGH$@I0"LA0C@$AHRGN0C&DDH404&0FPLHI5045$DB

Our understanding of clientelism is different. We do not assume that client-M d ieve t r a M

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Percentage of respondents reporting clien-
4$GHID0"C@&II0%)0<"4HL08D$@HC"L09&PL4@H$IB

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/"4"0'@&D045$0(O%f08D$@HC"Ib"@&D4@0RN0
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K78=0(O%)B08GG0*H#54I0*I@M$AB0!$@I&L"G0PI$0&LGNQ0C&DD$@CH"G0PI$0HI0I4@HC4GN0F@&5HRH4$AB0!G$"I$0I$$0"FFGHC"RG$0!@HM"CN0!&GHCN0
"LA0<$#"G0,&4HC$0>'&@0A$4"HGI0I$$!@HM"CN0!&GHCN "LA <$#"G0,&4HC$JB

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8D$@HC"0"@#PHL#045"40@"4H&L"G0F"@4H$I0AHIF@&F&@4H&L"GGN04"@#$40_$"^0IPFF&@4$@I0"LA0I_HL#0
M&4$@IB0*$I&P@C$I0"@$0_"I4$A0H'0F"@4H$I0HLM$I40HL0C&@$0IPFF&@4$@I=0_5&0F@$IPD"RGN0_HGG0

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AHI4@HRP4H&L0FG"L=04"@#$4HL#0C&@$0IPFF&@4$@I0HI0&'4$L0_5"40F"@4N0G$"A$@I0_"L4B

45$@$0"@$0&45$@04NF$I0&'0R@&^$@IB0 : &GG"LA0"LA0!"GD$@*PRHL0>(O%dJ0F@&F&I$0"04NF&G&#N0&'0 R@&^$@I0R"I$A0&L045$H@0@$G"4H&LI5HFI04&0F"@4H$I0"LA0HL4$@$I40#@&PFIB0!"@4N0R@&^$@I0"@$0 45&I$0_5&0D&RHGHY$0M&4$@I0'&@0"0IHL#G$0F"@4N0"LA0"@$0L&40DRAA$A0HL0"LN0&@#"LHY"4H&L=0 IPC50"I0D&I40!$@&LHI40!"@4N0&F$@"4HM$I0HL08@#$L4HL"0>$B#B=08PN$@&=(OO%Q0<$MH4I^N=(OOVQ0 74&^$I0$40"GB=(O%VQ07Y_"@CR$@#=(O%dQ0e"@"Y"#"=(O%fJB02@#"LHY"4H&L"G0R@&^$@I=0HL04P@L=0 "@$045&I0DRAAA0HL0"L0&@#"LHY"4H&L0_5&05"M$0_$"^0>&@0L&J0F"@4N04H$IB0<$"A$@I0&'0

street vending associations in Colombia, who negotiate blocs of votes with multiple par-

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ANL"DHCI0&'0CGH$L4$GHID0C5"L#0_5L0_$04"^$0HL4&0"CC&PL4045$0PI$0&'0&45$@0I4@"4$#H$Ik0
a$0^L&_=0'&@0$?"DFG$=045"40$G$C4&@"G0HL4HDHA"4H&L0HI0"L0$''$C4HM$=0"LA0DPC50C5$"F$@=0'&@D0
of demobilization, which on Election Day may prove the mathematical equivalent of buy-
HL#0M&4$I0>9&GGH$@0c0]HC$L4$=(O%fQ0[&LY"G$Y\2C"L4&I0$40"GB=12*-:923+,[JB0+L045H10
sense, the availability of violence infrastructures may reduce brokers' incentives to en-
gage in clientelism because prioritizing violence can free resources for personal enrich-
D$L4B0bP40F"@4N0R&II$I0F@$IPD"RGN0_"L40M&4$@I04&0GH^045D0"LA0L&404&0'$"@045$D=0"LA0
F@$'$@0R@&^$@I04&0PI$0C"@@&4I0@"45$@045"L0I4HC^IB08L0HL4$@$I4HL#0ZP$I4H&L0HI045$@$'&@$05&_0
bosses varying monitoring capacities affect the mix of clientelistic and intimidatory tac-
tics that brokers choose in such environments. Exploring how clientelism works amid vio-
lence is particularly relevant given the worsening security situation in many Latin Ameri-
C"L0C&PL4@H$I=0"I0_$GG0"I0F@&CIII0&'0A$D&C@"4HC0$@&IH&L0"C@&II045$0@$#H&L045"40G$"A04&0"0
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-5H@A=0@CL40AMG&FD$L4I0HL045$0'H$GA04"^$0I$@H&PIGN045$0"#$LCN0&'0CGH$L4I0MHI\q\MHI045$0
D"C5HL$B0-5HI0HI0"L0$IF$CH"GGN0F@&DHIHL#0"@$"0'&@0'P4P@$0HLZPH@NB0 3&I40&'045$0GH4$@"4P@$0&L0
clientelism has focused on elite-level strategies and "usually portrays clients as passive,
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K78=0(O%)B08GG0*H#54I0*I@M$AB0!$@I&L"G0PI$0&LGNQ0C&DD$@CH"G0PI$0HI0I4@HC4GN0F@&5HRH4$AB0!G$"I$0I$$0"FFGHC"RG$0!@HM"CN0!&GHCN0
"LA0<$#"G0,&4HC$0>'&@0A$4"HGI0I$$!@HM"CN0!&GHCN "LA<$#"G0,&4HC$JB

7PRIC@HR$@S0KLHM$@IH4N0&'0,&4@$0/"D$Q0A"4$S0(T08P#PI40(O%)

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9"L4h=01@"LCHIC&BO>(O%)JBO[@&C$@H$IO'&@0M&4$ISO-5$0GC4&@"GO@$4P@LIO&'0M&4$\RPNHL#B *Jour-*
= (3), 790–804.

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GC4&@"GOHL4$#@H4N0HL0 3 $?HC&B = , 1–14.

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P$IO"LA0CGH$L4$GHI4HC0M&4$0RPNHL#B = (1), 14–26.

95"DR$@I\iP=095@HI4&F5$@BO>(O%WJB
BOb$@^$G$N=098S0KLHM$@IH4N0&'09"GH'&@LH"0b$@^$G$NB

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4@&L"#$0A$D&C@"CH$IBO+LO:$@R$@40`H4IC5$G4=0c074M0aHG^HLI&LO>.AIBJ
=0,$_0;&@^=0, ;S0
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D$L40HLO,H#$@H"B = (574), F327–F355.

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D$L40_H450<+7-+-B = (1), 45–63.

/$0<"02=08L"0<BO>(O%VJBO/&0C&LAH4H&L"G0C"I504@"LI'$@IO"''$C40GC4&@"G0R$5"MH&@k0.MHA$LC$0
'@&D0"0@"LA&DHY$A0$?F$@HD$L40HL0 3 $?HC&B = (1), 1–
%fB

/$0<"02=08L"0<BO>(O%dJB BO,$_0;&@^=0, ;S0
9"DR@HA#$0KLHM$@IH4N0!@$IIB

DeMaio, Theresa J. (1984). Social desirability and survey. In Charles F. Turner & Eliza-
R$4503"@4HLO>.AIBJ= (pp. 257–282). Thousand Oaks, CA:
78[.$0KLHM$@IH4N0!@$448.1243 1.98L"0<BO>(O%dJB

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D"4H&LB = (4–5), 638–673.

:$@@$@"=0]$@&LHC"BO>(O%WJB BO
8LL08@R&@S0KLHM$@IH4N0&'03HC5H#"L0!@$IIB

:HC^$L=08GG$LBO>(O%%JB09GH$L4$GHIDB = , 289–310.

:&GG"LA=08GHI5"09B=0c0!"GD$@*PRHL=0b@H"LBO>(O%dJB A$30%4)&9$) (+.9#%$D)!"#$%&$"#'&)
E-0B$-')+%4)#%&$-$'&)0-?+%#F+&#0%')#%)*+&#%) , ($-#.+B =
(9), 1186–1223.

+D"H=0`&IP^$BO>(O%%JB03PG4HM"@H"4$0@$#@$IIH&L0"L"GNIHI0'&@045$0H4$D0C&PL404$C5LHZP$B *Jour-*
= (494), 407–416.

`H$_H$40A$0i&L#$=095"A0!BO>(O%dJB 8 90)"#$')+E02&)$"$.&0-+")?#>&':*Public Opinion Quar-*
= (3), 710–739.

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4H$IB = (6–7), 845–879.

`H4IC5$G4=0:$@R$@4=0c08G4"DH@"L&=03$GHL"BO>(O%dJB09GH$L4$GHIDOHL0<"4HL08D$@HC"S0+L
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74&^$I=07PI"L09B=0/PLLHL#=0-5"A=0, "Y"@$L&=03"@C$G&=0c0b@PIC&=0]"G$@H"BO>(O%VJB
. New York, NY: Cambridge Uni-
M$@IH4NO!@$IIB

Szwarcberg, Mariela. (2001). Feeding loyalties: An analysis of clientelism The case of the
3"LY"L$@"IBObP$L&I08H@$ISOKLHM$@IHA"AO/HO-$GG"B

7Y_"@CR$@#=03"@H$G"BO>(O%(JBOKLC$@4"HL4N=0F&GH4HC"GOCGH$L4$GHID=0"LAOM&4$@04P@L&P40HLO<"4HLO
8D$@HC"SOa5NOF"@4H$IOC&LAPC40@"GGH$IOHLO8@#$L4HL"B = (1), 88–106.

7Y_"@CR$@#=03"@H$G"BO>(O%dJB
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-&P@"L#$"P=0*&#$@=0c0;"L=0-HL#BO>(OOWJBO7$LIH4HM$0ZP$I4H&LIOHLOIP@M$NIB *Psychological Bul-*
= (5), 859–883.

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4$GHIDB = (3), 568–583.

a$H4Y\75"FH@&=0*$R$CC"BO>(O%fJB
BO, $_0;&@^=0, ;SO9"DR@HA#$0KLHM$@IH4NO!@$IIB

e"@"Y"#"=0*&A@H#&BO>(O%fJB0b@&^$@I0R$N&LA0CGH$L4$GHIDSO80L$_0F$@IF$C4HM$045@&P#5045$0
8@#$L4HL$0C"I$B = (3), 23–45.



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	>OB(TJ	>dBf%J		

B0 / ,E,80_$@$0C&A$A0"I0DHIIHL#B074"LA"@A0$@@&@I0HL0F"@$L45$I$IB0<HI40$?F$@HD$L4I0'@&D0`H$_H$40A$0i&L#$0 >(O%dJ0_$@$0C"GCPG"4$A0_H45045$0"M"HG"RG$0A"4"0PIHL#04_&\I"DFG$ \4$I40_H450PL$ZP"G0M"@H"LC$B

! *+,-./01*2 3045$02612*/0*.7.8*9:0.,9;9<2!./+8=0!2<+-+970>&?'&@A@$BC&DEF&GH4HCIJB0>CJ02?'&@A0KLHM$@IH4N0!@$II0K78=0(O%)B08GG0*H#54I0*I@M$AB0!$@I&L"G0PI$0&LGNQ0C&DD$@CH"G0PI$0 HI0I4@HC4GN0F@&5HRH4$AB0!G$"I$0I$$0"FFGHC"RG$0!@HM"CN0!&GHCN0"LA0<$#"G0,&4HC$0>'&@0A$4"HGI0I$$!@HM"CN0!&GHCN "LA<$#"G0,&4HC$JB

7PRIC@HR$@S0KLHM$@IH4N0&'0,&4@$0/"D$Q0A"4$S0(T08P#PI40(O%)

N0&$'D

>%BJ0-5HI0I$C4H&L0G"@#$GN0A@"_I0&L02GHM$@&I0>(O%T=0C5"F4$@0%JB

>(BJ0-5HI0A$'HLH4H&L0'&GG&_I0`H4IC5$G40"LA0aHG^HLI&L0>(OOWJ=0"LA074&^$I0>(OOW). For a distinction between clientelism and other forms of electoral strategies (including program-D"4HC0&L$IJ0I$$074&^$I0$40"GB0>(O%V, pp. 6–18).

>VBJ0,HC54$@0>(O%f) distinguishes “electoral clientelism,” in which the clientelistic exchange takes place around elections, from “relational clientelism,” in which the exchange HI0L&40@$I4@HC4$A04&045$0$G$C4&@"G0F$@H&AB

>fB

!*+,-./01*2 3045$02612*/0*.7.8*9:0.,9;9<2!./+8=0!2<+-+970>&?'&@A@$BC&DEF&GH4HCIJB0>CJ02?'&@A0KLHM$@IH4N0!@$II0K78=0(O%)B08GG0*H#54I0*I@M$AB0!$@I&L"G0PI$0&LGNQ0C&DD$@CH"G0PI$0HI0I4@HC4GN0F@&&5HRH4$AB0!G$"I$0I$$0"FFGHC"RG$0!@HM"CN0!&GHCN0"LA0<$#"G0,&4HC$0>'&@0A$4"HGI0I$$!@HM"CN0!&GHCN"LA<$#"G0,&4HC$JB